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Abstract
This paper concerns optimal income taxation in a two-type model extended
to allow for social interaction and social norms in the labor market. One type of
norm relates to the hours of work among the employed, and we assume that there
is a cost associated with deviating from ’normal behavior’ (deﬁn e di nt e r m so ft h e
average hours of work). Another type of norm refers to the pressure of earning
one’s living by working, where social interaction means that the perceived cost of
being out of employment depends on the share of nonworkers in the population.
T h er e s u l t ss h o wh o w ,a n dw h y ,t h ee x i s t e n c eo fs o c i a ln o r m sm a ym o d i f yr e s u l t s
derived in earlier literature. Under reasonable assumptions, the norm referring to
normal behavior in term of work hours provides an incentive for the government to
increase the hours of work supplied by the high-ability type relative to the hours
of work supplied by the low-ability type, whereas the norm of ’earning one’s living
by working’ strengthens the employment-motive behind tax policy.
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11 Introduction
There is a large literature dealing with diﬀerent aspects of social norms;
in particular, how such norms aﬀect the behavior of individuals and/or the
resulting consequences for macroeconomic outcomes. A basic message of ear-
lier research is that, although individual behavior might be constrained by
social norms, these norms may, in fact, magnify the behavioral and welfare
eﬀects of public policy, as norms may errode over a longer time perspective1.
As such, the potential existence of social norms is very important for our
understanding of the welfare consequences of public policy. Despite this, the
literature on optimal general income taxation has not (to our knowledge)
considered the possibility that social norms may inﬂuence the resource allo-
cation2. The purpose of this paper is to incorporate social norms related to
the labor market into the framework for studying optimal income taxation
developed by Stern (1982) and Stiglitz (1982).
Why are social norms, and their consequences for labor market outcomes,
interesting to consider in the context of optimal income taxation? First, in-
come from employment constitutes the most important source of income for
a majority of individuals in any industrialized country. This suggests that,
if social norms aﬀect the labor market outcome, then the consequences of
these norms are potentially relevant from the perspective of labor income
1See e.g. Lindbeck (1995). See also Jakee and Sun (2005), who analyze a dynamic
economy with external habit formation (formalized by assuming that the average con-
sumption of leisure in the economy as a whole aﬀects the utility of each individual). The
results imply that income redistribution policies may lead to a continuous increase in the
share of the population living on publicly provided beneﬁts and a continuous decrease in
the hours of work over time.
2Wendner (2005) analyzes eﬃcient taxation of labor income and emissions in a frame-
work with status seeking and habit formation. However, his model diﬀers substantially
from ours in terms of focus, norm formation and tax instruments.
2taxation. Second, and equally important, the labor market is often thought
of as being one of the main dimensions for behavioral responses to income
redistribution; the latter being an important purpose behind the labor in-
come tax. Therefore, if social norms modify the results derived in previous
studies, this adds to our understanding of how income taxation might be
u s e dt or e a c ha ne ﬃcient outcome while at the same time serving as one of
the main instruments for income redistribution.
Although in a diﬀerent context than our study, earlier literature dealing
with social norms and employment emphasizes, at least, two diﬀerent types
of norms. One type of norm refers to ’normal behavior’ with regards to
work hours3 and might be relevant primarily for those individuals who are
in employment. The basic idea is that individuals may compare themselves
with a reference group, and that there is a cost associated with deviating
from the normal behavior (often deﬁned as the average hours of work) in
this group4. Another type of norm reﬂects the pressure to earn one’s income
from work; alternatively the pressure against living on transfers from the
public sector. In other words, there may be a (perceived) cost of being out
of employment which, in part, determines whether an individual actively
seeks employment, or whether he/she attempts to live on publicly provided
beneﬁts. Social interaction may here imply that the cost of being out of
employment, for any individual, depends on the behavior of others. One
idea explored in earlier research is that the lower (higher) the fraction of
3This is one of the ideas emphasized in the literature dealing with the labor sup-
ply under interdependent behavior. For more thorough discussions of labor supply and
interdependent behavior, see e.g. Blomquist (1993), Woittiez and Kapteyn (1998) and
Aronsson et al. (1999).
4This also relates to the idea that the self-image depends on how the actual behavior
deviates from the behavior required by the norm. See e.g. Bruvoll and Nyborg (2004);
in their study, self-image is part of a model used to analyze recycling behavior.
3nonworking transfer recipients in the population, the higher (lower) this
cost to the individual5. Both types of norms - relating to the hours of
work among the employed and the pressure to earn one’s living by working,
respectively - will be addressed below.
The paper contributes to the literature in at least two ways. First, we
incorporate social interaction along the lines discussed above into a model,
which is designed for analyzing optimal general income taxation. This en-
ables us to connect the study of optimal taxation to earlier literature dealing
w i t ht h eb e h a v i o r a la n dw e l f a r ee ﬀects of social norms. In addition, since we
are considering a general income tax, the analysis also enables us to address
the interesting question of whether the existence of social norms in the labor
market provides an argument for tax distortions at the second best optimum.
Second, by allowing for employment-related motives behind tax policy, our
study relates to other literature on optimal income taxation under imper-
fect competition in the labor market6, where earlier research concentrates
on the consequences of involuntary unemployment (due to union wage for-
mation). Therefore, by focusing on other aspects of the labor market than
this earlier literature, the paper also provides a broader understanding of
how the functioning of the labor market contributes to the optimal income
tax structure.
In accordance with much of the earlier literature on optimal income taxa-
tion, we distinguish between two employed ability-types; a high-ability type
and a low-ability type, respectively, whereas those who do not work receive
a transfer payment from the public sector. As such, this transfer may re-
ﬂect social insurance or social assistance; however, as we do not attempt
to include health and/or life-cycle aspects in the model, we cannot make a
formal distinction between diﬀerent types of transfers. The government is
5See e.g. Lindbeck et al. (1999, 2003).
6See e.g. Fuest and Huber (1997) and Aronsson and Sjögren (2004).
4subject to the (conventional) informational restriction that, while it can ob-
serve the income of any individual, ability is private information. In Section
2, we present the model and the outcome of private optimization. Section 3
contains a description of the government’s decision problem and the results
in terms of optimal income taxation. Finally, the results are summarized
and discussed in Section 4.
2 The Model
As indicated above, we make a distinction between two types of employed
consumers; a low-ability type (denoted by superindex 1) and a high-ability
type (denoted by superindex 2). This distinction refers to productivity,
which is here interpreted to mean that the high-ability type faces a higher
before tax wage rate than the low-ability type. We denote by N1 and N2,
respectively, the number of individuals of each such ability-type.
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where ci denotes consumption and zi leisure. Leisure is, in turn, deﬁned as
at i m ee n d o w m e n t ,H,l e s st h et i m es p e n ti nm a r k e tw o r k ,li. The function
u(·) is assumed to be increasing in ci and zi as well as strictly quasiconcave.
The second part of equation (1) is a loss function, which is assumed to be
quadratic for notational convenience, where ρ > 0 is a ﬁxed parameter. We
assume that the average hours of work among the employed, ¯ l,c o n s t i t u t e s
the social norm for work hours, so the second part of the utility function
measures the utility loss of deviating from the average hours of work7.E a c h
7One possible, and likely, eﬀect of a social norm with respect to the hours of work is








where T(·) a general income tax. The ﬁrst order condition for the hours of
work becomes
∂ui





∂zi + ρ[¯ l − l
i]=0 (3)
where ui = u(ci,zi),w h i l eT  (·)=∂T(·)/∂(wili) is the marginal income tax
rate. If l2 >l 1 (which appears to be a reasonable assumption), it follows
that the low-ability type tends to choose more hours of work and the high-
ability type less hours of work than in the absence of the social norm. For
the analyses to be carried out later, note also that ∂li/∂¯ l>0,m e a n i n gt h a t
an increase in the average hours of work contributes to increase the hours
of work chosen by individuals of both ability-types.
Individuals who do not work, to be called ’nonworkers’ in what follows,
receive a beneﬁt, b, from the public sector. The budget constraint becomes
b − c0 =0 , where the superindex ”0”i su s e dt od e n o t e’ n o n w o r k e r ’ .T h e r e
are N0 ’genuine’ nonworkers, who are unable to work (for whatever reason),
and whom the government wants to support. The utility of each such gen-
uine nonworker is given by U0 =˜ u(c0,H),w h e r et h es y m b o l” ∼”i su s e dt o
indicate that the genuine nonworkers may have diﬀerent preferences (for in-
stance, a higher marginal utility of leisure) than the workers. Other possible
that individuals with low productivity may work too much, whereas the opposite applies
for individuals with high productivity. Our approach provides a simple framework for
capturing these possible eﬀects. Another approach would be to make the norm type-
speciﬁc. However, this complicates the analysis, as it may require that individuals of the
same ability-type diﬀer with respect to work hours; for instance, due to diﬀerences in the
utility loss of deviating from the (type-speciﬁc) average hours of work.
6nonworkers, i.e. agents who prefer to become nonworkers instead of being
employed, will be discussed below.
The production technology is linear, which means that the wage rate is
ﬁxed. This assumption simpliﬁes the analysis; it is not important for the
qualitative results to be derived with respect to the consequences of social
interaction for optimal taxation.
As mentioned above, we would like to capture the idea that some indi-
viduals of each ability-type, who are able to work, may choose to become
nonworkers; at least if the beneﬁts paid out to nonworkers by the govern-
ment are suﬃciently large. Furthermore, we assume that the government is
unable to discriminate between genuine and other nonworkers. Therefore,
even if the number of genuine nonworkers is common knowledge, the gov-
ernment does not know whether any given nonworkers is unable to work or
has chosen to become a nonworker. In our framework, the choice of whether
to work or become a nonworker depends on the norm that one should live
on one’s own work (provided that one is able to do so), implying that there
is a perceived cost to the individual of being a nonworker. We make two
additional assumptions; (i) the cost of being a nonworker varies between
individuals, and (ii) the cost facing any given individual decreases with the
share of nonworkers in the population. By ranking the Ni individuals of
ability-type i with respect to the perceived cost, from lowest to highest, of
being a nonworker, the number of nonworkers of ability-type i, ni, is implic-













for i =1 ,2, where the expression within square brackets (the third and
fourth terms on the left hand side) measures the utility of the ni:th individual
of ability-type i if he/she chooses to become a nonworker. The term ψi
n(·)
7is the perceived cost of being a nonworker facing the ni:th individual of
ability-type i in terms of the ranking referred to above, ˇ N =[ N0 + n1 +
n2]/M the fraction of nonworkers in the population and M = N0 + N1 +
N2 the total population. The function ψi
n(·) is such that ∂ψi
n(·)/∂ ˇ N<0
and ∂ψi
n(·)/∂ni > 0. To ensure that a higher cost of being a nonworker,
ceteris paribus, also means a smaller utility gain (or a greater utility loss)
of switching from the working to the nonworking state, we also assume that
the left hand side of (4) increases monotonically with ni.
Let ˇ N1 = N1 − n1 and ˇ N2 = N2 − n2 be the number of working low-
ability and high-ability types, respectively, and ˇ N0 = N0+n1+n2 the total
number of nonworkers. By solving equations (4), while recognizing that

















in which the constants N1 and N2 have been suppressed for notational con-
venience. Note that the incentive to become a nonworker for any ability-type
depends on the variables characterizing the other ability-type as well. The
latter is, in part, a consequence of the assumption that, for each ability-type,
the cost of being a nonworker depends on the fraction on nonworkers in the
population.
Each consumer is assumed to correctly anticipate (and treat as exoge-
nous), the values of the policy instruments chosen by the government as well
as the ’aggregate variables’ ¯ l, n1 and n2. A Nash equilibrium in the private
sector means that the private budget constraints as well as equations (3), (5)
and (6) are fulﬁlled simultaneously. In what follows, we assume that the pri-
vate sector has reached such a Nash equilibrium, and that it is characterized
by n1 ∈ (0,N1) and n2 ∈ (0,N2).
83 The Optimal Tax and Expenditure Problem
We begin by discussing the objective and constraints facing the government.
With this decision problem at our disposal, we continue by analyzing the
outcome in terms of optimal taxation.
3.1 The Decision Problem of the Government
We concentrate on Pareto eﬃcient taxation, which will be analyzed by max-
imizing the utility of one of the agent-types subject to minimum utility
restrictions for the others. Suppose that the government behaves as if it
maximizes the utility of the employed low-ability type subject to minimum
utility restrictions for the employed high-ability type and the genuine non-
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2 ≥ 0 (7)
˜ u(c
0,H) − ¯ U
0 ≥ 0 (8)
where ¯ U2 and ¯ U0 are ﬁxed.
The informational assumptions are conventional: the government knows
the income of each individual as well as the number of individuals of each
agent-type, whereas ability is private information. The latter means that,
in the absence of appropriate type-revealing mechanisms, the government
would not be able to observe whether any given worker is a low-ability or
high-ability type. By concentrating on the ’normal’ case, where redistribu-
tion means income transfers from high income earners to low income earners,
one would like to prevent the high-ability type from pretending to be a low-
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where ˆ U2 denotes the utility of a high-ability mimicker, and φ = w1/w2 < 1
i st h er e l a t i v ew a g er a t e .
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in which we have used the private budget constraints, T 1(w1l1)=w1l1 −c1,
T 2(w2l2)=w2l2 − c2 and c0 = b, respectively.
With a general income tax, the government can eﬀectively choose any
desired combination of work hours and consumption for each ability-type,
meaning that it is more convenient to use l1, c1, l2 and c2, instead of the pa-
rameters of the income tax function, as the direct decision variables. There-
fore, the optimization problem facing the government is to choose l1, c1, l2,
c2 and c0 such as to maximize the utility of the low-ability type subject to
the minimum utility restrictions, the self-selection constraint and the bud-
get constraint, as well as subject to equations (5) and (6) which deﬁne the
number of individuals of each ability-type who choose to become nonworkers
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where δ, ζ, λ and γ are Lagrange multipliers, whereas U1, U2, U0, ˆ U2, ˇ N1,
ˇ N2 and ˇ N0 were deﬁned above. The ﬁrst order conditions are presented in
the Appendix.
103.2 Optimal Taxation
Given the framework set out above, our purpose is to analyze the optimal
tax structure. In particular, our concern will be to examine whether the
appearance of social norms in the context of the labor market constitutes a
motive for using distortionary labor income taxation.
Special Case: Social Interaction with Respect to the Hours of Work
It is convenient to begin by brieﬂy considering the special case, where (i)
the ability of each employed individual is fully observed, and (ii) the norm
that one should live on one’s own work is strong enough to imply that all
individuals (who are able to work) prefer employment over nonparticipation
at the second best optimum. In terms of the model set out above, these
simpliﬁcations imply that λ = n1 = n2 =0 .T h i ss p e c i a lc a s ee n a b l e su st o
concentrate on the implications of the social norm with respect to the hours
of work, which is clearly relevant from the perspective of earlier research on
labor supply. It will also simplify the presentation of results in later parts
of the paper. Consider Proposition 1;
Proposition 1If λ = n1 = n2 =0at the optimum, the marginal income tax

















Proof: See the Appendix.
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is straight forward. If ability were
fully observable, and if the perceived cost of being a nonworker were suﬃ-
ciently high for all agents, then the government would be able to redistribute
by means of ability-type speciﬁc lump-sum taxes together with the transfer
11payment to the genuine nonworkers (without creating strong enough incen-
tives for nonparticipation among those who are able to work). As a conse-
quence, the only remaining reason for using distortionary income taxation
is that agents adapt to a social norm by modifying their hours of work. In
other words, we would like to internalize the external eﬀect following as the
average hours of work is an argument in the utility functions (and treated
as exogenous in the context of private optimization).
To be able to interpret Proposition 1, suppose that the hours of work
increase with productivity, so l2 >l 1. In this case, starting with the tax
formula for the low-ability type, the ﬁrst term on the right hand side,
ρ[¯ l−l1][∂¯ l/∂l1], is positive. This eﬀect serves to decrease l1 and, therefore, ¯ l
which, in turn, contributes to reduce the utility loss for the low-ability type
due to the social norm. As such, it prevents the low-ability type from adapt-
i n gt ot h en o r mb yc h o o s i n gt o om a n yw o r kh o u r sf r o mt h ep e r s p e c t i v eo f
society. Therefore, without a minimum utility restriction on the high-ability
type, this would imply a positive marginal income tax rate for the low-ability
type. However, this eﬀect is, at least in part, oﬀset by the second term on
the right hand side, δρ[¯ l − l2][∂¯ l/∂l1], which is negative and contributes to
decrease the marginal income tax rate. The intuition is that a higher l1 in-
creases ¯ l which, in turn, reduces the utility loss for the high-ability type due
the social norm. This serves to prevent the high-ability type from adapt-
ing to the norm by choosing too few hours of work from the perspective of
society.
We can interpret the tax formula for the high-ability type in a similar
way. The ﬁrst term on the right hand side, ρ[¯ l − l2][∂¯ l/∂l2], is negative and
serves to oﬀset the tendency for the high-ability type to adapt to the norm
by choosing too few hours of work. On the other hand, the the second term,
ρ[¯ l−l1][∂¯ l/∂l2]/δ, is positive and contributes to reduce the hours of work by
12the high-ability type which, in turn, reduces ¯ l and, therefore, also the hours
of work by the low-ability type. The latter is desirable, as we mentioned
above, since the low-ability type tends to adapt to the norm by choosing too
many hours of work.
The following result is an immediate consequence of Proposition 1;
Corollary 1: Suppose that λ = n1 = n2 =0at the optimum, and that the
hours of work increase with productivity, so l2 >l 1. Then, in the special
case with a utilitarian social welfare function, where δ =1 ,a n di fN2 >
(<) N1, the two marginal income tax rates are positive (negative).
Although the exact result in Corollary 1 is due to the functional form of
the loss function, the qualitative message is, nevertheless, more general; the
distribution of ability-types determines (to some extent) whether a social
norm with respect to the hours of work constitutes a motive for taxing or
subsidizing labor at the margin8.
The General Model
Let us now turn to the more general model described in section 2. Since the
average hours of work is treated as exogenous in the context of the individual
hours of work decision, it is useful to make a distinction between the private
and social marginal rates of substitution between leisure and consumption
for each ability-type. The the private marginal rate of substitution between
leisure and consumption is deﬁned in the usual way, given the functional




∂u(ci,zi)/∂zi − ρ[¯ l − li]
∂u(ci,zi)/∂ci
8If N1is large relative to N2, then the high-ability type faces a greater utility loss due
to the social norm than the low-ability type, suggesting that the argument for subsidizing
labor at the margin may dominate. If, on the other hand, N2 is large relative to N1,t h e
opposite argument applies.
13where the numerator is interpretable as the private marginal utility of leisure
(the negative of the private marginal utility of labor), which is deﬁned con-
ditional on ¯ l. In a similar way, the ability-type speciﬁc social marginal rate










in which case we also recognize how li aﬀects ¯ l in terms of the utility function




[∂u(c1, ˆ z2)/∂ˆ z2]φ − ρ[¯ l − φl1][φ − ∂¯ l/∂l1]
∂u(c1, ˆ z2)/∂c1
where ˆ z2 = H − φl1. In addition, deﬁne ∆i as a short notation for the
derivative of the Lagrangean with respect to ni, i.e. ∆i = ∂L/∂ni.T h e
marginal income tax rates are deﬁn e di nP r o p o s i t i o n2b e l o w ;























































where α1 =( ∂U1/∂c1)(δ + λ)/(γ ˇ N1), α2 =( ∂U2/∂c2)/(γ ˇ N2) and λ∗ =
λ(∂ ˆ U2/∂c1)/γ.
14The proof of Proposition 2 is analogous to the proof of Proposition 1 and
is, therefore, omitted. Let us start with the tax formula for the low-ability
type. The ﬁrst row on the right hand side is analogous to, and has the same
interpretation as, the tax formula presented in Proposition 1. As such, it
captures the corrective motive for taxation discussed above, which follows
because a social norm aﬀects the hours of work decision.
The second row reﬂects the self-selection constraint. The main diﬀerence
in comparison with earlier research on redistribution with general income
taxation is that this eﬀect is here deﬁned in terms of the ability-type speciﬁc
social (instead of private) marginal rates of substitution; there is a discrep-
ancy between these two concepts, since each individual treats ¯ l as exogenous.
The general interpretation is, nevertheless, analogous to the interpretations
given to the self-selection eﬀect in earlier research. Therefore, if MRSS1
z,c >
(<)   MRSS
2
z,c, then the government may relax the self-selection constraint
by choosing a higher (lower) marginal income tax rate for the low-ability
type than it would otherwise have done.
The third row is interpretable as employment eﬀects, and reﬂects an in-
c e n t i v ef o rt h eg o v e r n m e n tt oi n ﬂuence the private decision of whether to
work or become a nonworker. From a technical perspective, these employ-
ment eﬀects resemble results derived in the literature on optimal taxation
under involuntary unemployment9. At the same time, there is a fundamen-
tal diﬀerence; whereas the existence of involuntary unemployment implies
that the income tax is used to aﬀect employment via the labor demand, the
employment eﬀects discussed here are due to the desire to aﬀect the indi-
viduals’ decisions to participate in the labor market, which is part of the
labor supply decision. Note that we can interpret ∆i as the welfare eﬀect
following if one additional individual of ability-type i chooses to become a
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where our deﬁnition of ¯ l means that ∂¯ l/∂n1 > 0 and ∂¯ l/∂n2 < 0. The second
r o wo fe q u a t i o n( 1 2 )i st h eﬁscal part of this welfare eﬀect; it measures
the decrease in the tax revenues net of transfer payment if one additional
individual of ability-type i chooses to become a nonworker times the marginal
cost of public funds in utility terms. Therefore, to gain tax revenues, there is
a ﬁscal incentive to reduce the number of nonworkers. The terms in the ﬁrst
row appear because the average hours of work among the employed depends
on the number of nonworkers of each ability-type. To interpret these terms,
we assume that l2 >l 1, as we did above. Consider ﬁrst the eﬀect of an
increase in n1, which leads to an increase in ¯ l, ceteris paribus. This implies
(i) a welfare loss facing the low-ability type because a higher ¯ l increases
ρ[¯ l − l1]2, (ii) a welfare gain facing the high-ability type because a higher ¯ l
reduces ρ[¯ l − l2]2, and (iii) a welfare gain because mimicking becomes less
attractive, i.e. the mimicker must put in extra eﬀort to mimick the low-
ability type. An increase in n2 has the opposite eﬀects in terms of the ﬁrst
row of equation (12), since an increase in n2 reduces ¯ l.
To provide further interpretations, let us add three assumptions, all of
which appear to be intuitively reasonable; (i) ∆i < 0, (ii) ∂nj/∂ci < 0 and
(iii) ∂nj/∂li > 0 for i =1 ,2,a n dj =1 ,2.T h e ﬁrst assumption means
that an increase in the number of nonworkers of ability-type i decreases the
welfare; for instance, that the ﬁscal part of this welfare eﬀect is suﬃciently
strong. This may be more realistic in Western European countries than in
many other countries due to the relatively high taxes and generous transfer
programs in Western Europe. Each of the second and third assumptions
16contains two parts. First, if we were to increase ci (li), ceteris paribus, then
the utility of being employed increases (decreases) relative to the utility of
being a nonworker, suggesting that ∂ni/∂ci < 0 (∂ni/∂li > 0). Second, if ci
(li) increases, ceteris paribus, so the number of nonworkers of ability-type i
decreases (increases) by our earlier assumption, it will also follow that the
perceived cost of being a nonworker for ability-type j increases (decreases).
This argument suggests that ∂nj/∂ci < 0 (∂nj/∂li > 0)f o rj  = i. The latter
is a consequence of social interaction, i.e. that the cost of being a nonworker
facing each individual depends on the share of nonworkers in the economy
as a whole. The comparative statics properties of the functions n1(·) and
n2(·), given by equations (5) and (6), respectively, are formally addressed in
the Appendix.
Therefore, with the additional assumptions made above, it follows that
social interaction in terms of participation tends to strengthen the employ-
ment eﬀects in each tax formula. Consider ﬁrst the employment eﬀect asso-
ciated with the hours of work supplied by the low-ability type. A lower l1
contributes to reduce n1, which is an argument for reducing l1 via a higher
marginal income tax rate for the low-ability type. This argument is further
strengthened if a lower l1 also contributes to reduce n2. Therefore, social
interaction in terms of participation constitutes an additional motive for
reducing the hours of work among the employed (here exempliﬁed by the
low-ability type) in order to make participation more attractive relative to
nonparticipation. The idea of replacing work hours per employee by addi-
tional employees resembles work sharing, although the argument is, in this
case, based on mechanisms referring to the supply (and not the demand)
side of the labor market.
However, due to budget-balance arguments, there is also an indirect cost
in terms of lost employment of a higher marginal income tax rate. To see
17this, note that a higher marginal income tax rate for the low-ability type,
which reduces l1, also tends to reduce c1, since less resources will be avail-
able for private consumption. By the assumptions made earlier, this eﬀect
contributes to increase n1 and n2, where the latter is due primarily to social
interaction. The more the consumption decreases in response to a given
decrease in the hours of work, the weaker the employment-related argument
for increasing the marginal income tax rates. It is not clear on theoretical
grounds whether or not the direct employment eﬀects following a change in
the hours of work dominate the indirect employment eﬀects, which are due
to the associated changes in private consumption.
Turning to the marginal income tax rate of the high-ability type, the tax
formula takes (almost) the same general form as, and is interpretable in a way
similar to, the corresponding formula for the low-ability type. Except for the
traditional self-selection term in the tax formula for the low-ability type, one
apparent diﬀerence between the two formulas is that −α2λρ[¯ l−φl1] < 0 is a
separate argument in the expression for the marginal income tax rate facing
the high-ability type, while the corresponding expression for the low-ability
type is hidden in   MRSS
2
z,c. The result that the self-selection constraint
directly aﬀects the marginal income tax rate facing the high-ability type
(and not just the marginal income tax rate of the low-ability type) diﬀers
from earlier literature on optimal income taxation. This is a consequence of
social interaction in terms of work hours; l2 aﬀects ¯ l and, therefore, the self-
selection constraint. To be more speciﬁc, this eﬀect contributes to reduce
the marginal income tax rate of the high-ability type. The intuition is that
a lower marginal income tax rate increases l2 and, as a consequence, ¯ l.T h e
latter makes mimicking less attractive, as it implies that the mimicker must
put in more eﬀort to reach the same level of consumption as the low-ability
type.
184 Summary and Discussion
This paper is a ﬁrst attempt to incorporate social norms into the theory of
optimal general income taxation in a two-type setting. We concentrate the
analysis on social norms associated with the labor market and distinguish
between two types of norms; (i) normal behavior with regards to work hours
and (ii) the pressure to earn one’s income from work. Social interaction
aﬀects norm formation in the sense that there is a perceived cost associated
with deviating from the normal behavior with regards to work hours, where
normal behavior is deﬁned in terms of the average hours of work among the
employed. Similarly, there is a perceived cost of being out of employment
to each individual, which depends on the share of nonworkers (living on
publicly provided beneﬁts).
Since each individual is assumed to treat the average hours of work as
exogenous during optimization, the social norm with regards to work hours
gives rise to a corrective motive for taxation. As such, it may either con-
tribute to increase or decrease the marginal income tax rates in comparison
with the outcome under perfect competition. Under reasonable assumptions,
this norm provides an incentive for the government to increase the hours of
work supplied by the high-ability type relative to the hours of work supplied
by the low-ability type. Furthermore, the possibility for the individual to
choose to become a nonworker gives rise to so called ’employment eﬀects’ in
the expressions for the marginal income tax rates, since the government can
inﬂuence this choice via income taxation. Each of these employment eﬀects
are, in turn, likely to be magniﬁed by social interaction, since an increase in
the number of nonworking low-ability types reduces the cost of being out of
employment for the high-ability type and vice versa.
Clearly, there an several ways of introducing social norms, and our study
merely exempliﬁes how, and why, such norms may be relevant in the context
19of income taxation. Our message is that social norms may, in general, aﬀect
the income tax structure, both because the government wants to inﬂuence
the hours of work decision made by those in employment, and because it
wants to inﬂuence the incentives underlying the participation decision (or,
more generally, the incentives to search for employment). It would be inter-
esting to extend the analysis by allowing individuals of the same ability-type
to diﬀer with respect to the cost of deviating from normal behavior in terms
of work hours, in which case this norm may be ability-type speciﬁc, as well
as to incorporate social insurance more thoroughly. The latter may necessi-
tate using an intertemporal model. We leave these and other extensions for
future research.
5 Appendix
Let ∆i = ∂L/∂ni be the derivative of the Lagrangean with respect to the
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in which we have used the short notations ui = u(ci,zi) for i =1 ,2, u0 =
˜ u(c0,H), ˆ u2 = u(c1,H− φl1) and ˆ z2 = H − φl1.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1
Consider ﬁrst the marginal income tax rate facing the low-ability type. By
using equations (A1) and (A2), we can derive
∂u1/∂z1 − ρ[¯ l − l1][1 − ∂¯ l/∂l1]
∂u1/∂c1 [λ
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Then, combining equations (3) and (A6), while assuming that λ =0 , n1 =0
and n2 =0 , we can derive the formula for T (w1l1). The formula for T (w2l2)
can be derived in a similar way. Except for the additional restrictions im-
posed on λ, n1 and n2 above, the proof of Proposition 2 is analogous.
Comparative Statics
Deﬁne






















































∂z1 − ρ[¯ l − l
1] (A11)



















∂z2 − ρ[¯ l − l
2] (A12)













|Ω| = Λ11Λ22 − Λ12Λ21 (A13)
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∂c0 [Λ22 − Λ12] (A18)
The comparative statics of n2 are analogous.
22To motivate the additional assumptions about the properties of n1(·)
and n2(·) made in subsection 3.2, consider equations (A7)-(A10). Since we
would like to concentrate on the decision of whether or not to participate,
and not the hours of work among the employed, suppose that the indirect
eﬀects of n1 and n2 via ¯ l are not strong enough to dominate the other
terms. In addition, to ensure that we are actually ranking the individuals
from the lowest to the higherst cost of being out of employment, we assume
that (∂ψi
n/∂ ˇ N)(1/M)+∂ψi
n/∂ni > 0 for i =1 ,2. These two assumptions
mean Λ11 > 0, Λ12 < 0, Λ21 < 0 and Λ22 > 0. Then, if |Ω| > 0,w h i c hi s
reasonable by similar arguments, a possible (and arguably likely) outcome
of equations (A14)-(A17) would be ∂n1/∂c1 < 0, ∂n1/∂l1 > 0, ∂n1/∂c2 < 0
and ∂n1/∂l2 > 0.
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